


























































published: 02 January 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00333
Conceptual structure within and between modalities
Katia Dilkina and MatthewA. Lambon Ralph*
Neuroscience and Aphasia Research Unit, School of Psychological Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
Edited by:
Paul D. Siakaluk, University of
Northern British Columbia, Canada
Reviewed by:
Jamie Reilly, University of Florida,
USA
Sebastian Crutch, University College
London, UK
*Correspondence:
Matthew A. Lambon Ralph,
Neuroscience and Aphasia Research
Unit, School of Psychological
Sciences, University of Manchester,
Zochonis Building, Oxford Road,
Manchester M13 9PL, UK.
e-mail: matt.lambon-ralph@
manchester.ac.uk
Current views of semantic memory share the assumption that conceptual representa-
tions are based on multimodal experience, which activates distinct modality-specific brain
regions. This proposition is widely accepted, yet little is known about how each modal-
ity contributes to conceptual knowledge and how the structure of this contribution varies
across these multiple information sources. We used verbal feature lists, features from
drawings, and verbal co-occurrence statistics from latent semantic analysis to examine
the informational structure in four domains of knowledge: perceptual, functional, encyclo-
pedic, and verbal.The goals of the analysis were three-fold: (1) to assess the structure within
individual modalities; (2) to compare structures between modalities; and (3) to assess the
degree to which concepts organize categorically or randomly. Our results indicated signif-
icant and unique structure in all four modalities: perceptually, concepts organize based on
prominent features such as shape, size, color, and parts; functionally, they group based on
use and interaction; encyclopedically, they arrange based on commonality in location or
behavior; and verbally, they group associatively or relationally. Visual/perceptual knowledge
gives rise to the strongest hierarchical organization and is closest to classic taxonomic
structure. Information is organized somewhat similarly in the perceptual and encyclope-
dic domains, which differs significantly from the structure in the functional and verbal
domains. Notably, the verbal modality has the most unique organization, which is not at
all categorical but also not random. The idiosyncrasy and complexity of conceptual struc-
ture across modalities raise the question of how all of these modality-specific experiences
are fused together into coherent, multifaceted yet unified concepts. Accordingly, both
methodological and theoretical implications of the present findings are discussed.
Keywords: concepts, conceptual organization, semantic system, modality-specific knowledge, multimodal knowl-
edge, hub-and-spoke model
INTRODUCTION
We experience objects and entities in the world through many
different modalities. We experience them perceptually through
observation (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile), as
well as functionally through interaction and use. Remember the
eggs that you had for breakfast this morning? Consider the rich-
ness of this simple perceptual and motor experience. In addition,
we experience objects contextually or in relation to other objects,
entities, or places. For example, eggs are usually eaten at breakfast,
often accompanied by sausage or bacon. Finally, there is the abun-
dant verbal experience when we read, write, or talk about things
in the world.
Each of these modalities provides a rich and unique experience,
and contributes to our semantic knowledge – our cross-modal
conceptual knowledge. All contemporary theories of semantic
memory and its neural basis share the assumption that semantic
representations are formed from multimodal experience, coded in
distinct modality-specific brain regions. Furthermore, the regions
representing information relevant to a specific item are activated
during semantic processing whether or not this type of infor-
mation is explicitly required by the task/activity. Considerable
evidence has been accumulated in favor of these ideas (see Martin,
2007; Patterson et al., 2007; Thompson-Schill, 2003 for reviews).
For example, in a PET neuroimaging paradigm, Martin et al.
(1995) asked a group of participants to name either the color or
the action associated with visually presented objects. They found
that generating action words activated the left posterior mid-
dle temporal gyrus (associated with visual motion processing),
while producing color words activated the fusiform gyrus (asso-
ciated with visual form and color processing). Similar patterns
of activation were obtained in different experimental paradigms
which did not explicitly present or require object properties of
specific knowledge type, including brief picture viewing (Chao
et al., 1999), picture naming (e.g., Martin et al., 1996; Chao et al.,
1999; Moore and Price, 1999), visual match-to-sample (Chao et al.,
1999), and same/different judgments with pairs of pictures or
words (Perani et al., 1999). In all of these studies, manipulable
objects such as tools tend to activate the left posterior MTG more
than living things such as animals, which preferentially engage
posterior inferior temporo-occipital regions. More detailed inves-
tigations have identified distinct areas in the left posterior lateral
temporal lobe responding to biological motion vs. object motion
(e.g., Beauchamp et al., 2002). The distributed nature of concep-
tual representations has been investigated not only in the visual
and motor modalities, but also in other perceptual modalities. For
example, Simmons et al. (2005) presented their participants with
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pictures of appetizing foods along with pictures of locations. They
used a simple same/different judgment task to elicit fMRI activa-
tion contrasts for these two categories. The results showed that
even in this simple task, food items preferentially activated two
areas associated with gustatory/olfactory processing – the right
insula and the left orbitofrontal cortex (see also Goldberg et al.,
2006; González et al., 2006). These neuroimaging findings have
been complemented by neuropsychological reports of patients
with category-specific semantic deficits (greater impairment for
living vs. non-living things or vice versa, greater impairment for
fruits and vegetables vs. tools, and so on), where lesion locations
match the brain areas and functional specialization suggested by
the functional imaging studies with unimpaired individuals (e.g.,
Tranel et al., 1997).
Another group of related studies have explored the relationship
between conceptual categories and different types of modality-
specific information sources by analyzing verbally generated fea-
ture lists from unimpaired individuals. For example, Garrard et al.
(2001) collected directed feature norms for 62 items from six
categories. They classified the features as sensory, functional, or
encyclopedic (see Materials and Methods) and investigated how
the three types of features compared across the six categories.
They found that living things tended to have more sensory than
functional attributes compared to non-living things; they also had
more encyclopedic attributes. Furthermore, living things had less
distinctive and more shared features than non-living things. A
similar investigation, though on a substantially larger scale, was
conducted by Cree and McRae (2003), who collected verbal fea-
ture norms for 541 concrete concepts. The authors argued that
a full understanding of category-specific deficits would have to
go beyond the distinction between sensory and functional fea-
tures. They proposed a classification consisting of nine different
knowledge types processed in distinct neural regions (Table 1).
Using their detailed classification, Cree and McRae (2003) showed
that all feature types play a role in distinguishing among concep-
tual categories, though admittedly some knowledge types were
more relevant to specific categories than others. For example,
not surprisingly, the feature type of visual motion was impor-
tant for the category of creatures but unimportant for fruits and
vegetables, which relied more on visual-color features, etc. The
results from a large hierarchical cluster analysis combining the
knowledge types with a number of other factors including the
proportion of distinguishing features for each category, visual
similarity and complexity, semantic similarity, concept familiar-
ity, and word frequency, demonstrated a unique and significant
contribution of all factors to the conceptual structure present in
their data set. In order to go beyond just those feature types that
are most readily reported verbally, Hoffman and Lambon Ralph
(2012) asked participants to rate the importance of each sensory
and verbal modality to 100 different concepts. Not only did the
results complement the previous verbal feature listings but the
study found that information arising in other modalities such as
sound, motion, smell, and taste (which are rarely reported in ver-
bal listing studies) also provided important differential experience
across categories.
In summary, previous investigations have focused on the rela-
tionship between categories and feature types. While these studies
Table 1 |Types of knowledge and associated brain regions assumed by
Cree and McRae (2003).
Knowledge type Brain region
Visual – color Bilateral posterior ventral temporal cortex
Visual – parts and
surface properties
Bilateral ventral occipital cortex
Visual – motion Left posterior middle temporal gyri
Tactile Dominant hand and finger areas of primary
somatosensory and motor cortices
Olfactory Piriform cortex and right lateral orbitofrontal cortex




Auditory Bilateral posterior superior temporal gyrus
†
Functional Left ventral premotor cortex
Encyclopedic Multiple regions
† Area not specified by Cree and McRae (2003).
have provided important insights about semantic representation
and the nature of category-specific deficits, in this investigation
we returned to consider the primary hypothesis held by contem-
porary theories of semantic memory – namely that concepts arise
from the convergence of our multimodal, verbal, and non-verbal
experience. As such, it becomes important to understand the dis-
tribution and structure of representation in each modality and
how this contributes to the overall multimodal semantic represen-
tation. Accordingly, a series of fundamental questions arise: What
does the structure within each of these modalities look like? Is
it random? Is it categorical/taxonomic? What principles govern
the organization of information within modality? How do they
compare across modalities?
The goal of this study was to investigate the formation of con-
cepts overall. Thus, we took a novel approach in order to look
in more detail at four different modalities of knowledge – visual,
verbal, encyclopedic, and functional. We investigated how each
modality contributes to the overall semantic representation and
how the structure in each modality varies.
There are different ways in which each modality can be probed
empirically and how the data arising are treated. We, therefore,
compared across the methods directly. As far as we are aware, these
direct comparisons have not been made before. For example, we
compared information about visual experience as derived from
verbal feature listings (two methods each deriving features in a
slightly different way) as well as those extracted from participants’
drawings of the same concepts. Secondly, we compared feature
data (itself a reflection of verbal experience) against the struc-
ture present in a very large verbal corpus which does not attempt
to derive attributes but instead utilizes co-occurrence statistics to
infer the underlying representations [in this case, derived from
latent semantic analysis (LSA) of the British National Corpus].
Our study had three distinct goals: (1) to establish the organiza-
tion of information arising in each modality of knowledge; (2) to
compare the structure between the various modalities; and (3) to
assess the degree to which concepts in each modality are organized
taxonomically or randomly.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
We utilized four different data sets reported in the literature, which
gave us four different types of representations – perceptual, func-
tional, encyclopedic, and verbal. Each of the data sets is described
below.
GARRARD ET AL. FEATURE LISTINGS DATA SET
Garrard et al. (2001) asked 20 adult volunteers (mean age 67 years
old) to list features for each of 62 items (originally 64 but two
of the items were subsequently excluded). The participants were
prompted to list the category of each item as well as two to six
descriptive features (“an elephant is. . .”), two to six parts features
(“an elephant has. . .”), and two to six abilities-and-uses features
(“an elephant can. . .”). After the initial data collection, the features
were processed to use standardized wording (since a given feature
can often be described in multiple ways) and to exclude qualifying,
exemplifying, or highly idiosyncratic information. Only features
listed by at least two participants were considered. They were clas-
sified as sensory, functional (action, activity, or use of an item),
encyclopedic (associative relationships), or categorical. The set of
features consisted of 50% sensory, 28% functional, 15% encyclo-
pedic, and 7% categorical. We used the sensory, functional, and
encyclopedic features from this set.
CREE AND McRae FEATURE LISTINGS DATA SET
Cree and McRae (2003) reported a list of features produced by
undergraduate students for a set of 541 concepts commonly used
in categorization and semantic memory tasks. In their feature
elicitation method, each participant was presented with 20 or 24
(mostly dissimilar) concept names alongside 10 blank lines to be
filled with features of each item. Thirty participants provided fea-
tures for each of the 541 concepts. Only features that were listed by
at least five participants were included in the report. The feature
listings were not edited in any way. Excluding taxonomic labels, the
authors classified each of the features as belonging to one of nine
types: seven perceptual types (visual – color, visual – parts, and sur-
face properties, visual – motion, smell, taste, touch, and sound), a
functional type (how one interacts with the item), and an encyclo-
pedic type (all non-perceptual and non-functional descriptors).
They reasoned that these were widely accepted knowledge types,
which are processed in distinct neural regions (see Table 1).
Since most of the perceptual knowledge types included few
features, we combined them into a single perceptual classifica-
tion, along with the functional and encyclopedic feature types – a
classification comparable to the one used by Garrard et al. (2001).
ROGERS ET AL. PICTURE DRAWINGS DATA SET
Instead of using verbal feature listings, Rogers et al. (2004) asked
eight participants (mean age of 62) to draw from name the same 64
items as Garrard et al. (2001) had presented to their participants
for verbal feature generation. The subjects had 1 min to draw each
item and were told that their drawings would not be judged for
artistic merit but be assessed for the degree to which they correctly
represented the nature of the object. Two independent raters com-
piled lists of all the visual features present each drawing. Features
included by only a single participant were excluded. After this
initial data collection, the feature lists were compared to the draw-
ings once more and features that described overlapping or similar
aspects of the drawings were combined together to produce the
final visual feature description of each item. We considered the
Rogers et al. set as another source of information about how per-
ceptual experience contributes to our conceptual knowledge and
compared this information source to the subset of verbal features
given a perceptual classification (see above).
HOFFMAN ET AL. LATENT SEMANTIC ANALYSIS DATA SET
The final data set we utilized did not include feature lists.
Instead, it provided representations for numerous items based
on their patterns of occurrence in verbal context. Hoffman
et al. (2011, 2012) performed LSA on the British National
Corpus, which contains over 87 million words in 3125 docu-
ments. The authors split the original documents into 1000-word-
long samples, which gave them 87,375 smaller documents. Only
words that appeared at least 50 times in the corpus and in at
least 40 different documents were included. The resultant LSA
produced 300-dimensional representational vectors for 38,456
words1.
In order to compare the representations across the various
knowledge types, we took the intersection of these data sets, which
gave us a list of 52 concepts. Table 2 presents basic statistics for
each of the feature data sets. Two things should be noted. First,
even though the 52 items were present in each data set, they did
not necessarily have entries for all feature types: 47 items had ency-
clopedic features in the Garrard et al. set; another subset of 47 had
encyclopedic features in the Cree and McRae set; and a smaller
subset of 38 had functional features in the Cree and McRae set.
Secondly, an important aspect of the feature-based representations
is their density. While all three data sets included a great number
of features, the percent of features per item, that is the average
number of features listed for a single concept divided by the total
number of features of this type (i.e., representational density), was
relatively low. Most strikingly, the Cree and McRae data set, which
was the only one where the initially collected lists of features were
not further processed or edited, had the lowest density, for all
feature types.
Why might low representational density indicate a problem?
When there is a great number of features but each of these features
applies to singular or few items, it is possible that there is some
information missing− that some of these features in fact apply to
more of the items. The problem is more severe than simply that
of “missing” information because, in a binary type of representa-
tion, each item either has a feature or it does not; there is no such
thing as “unknown.” So when a feature is missing, it is effectively
non-existent for the item. For example, when the data set fails to
specify that a dog has a neck, it in fact specifies that a dog does not
have a neck.
1The high dimensional semantic space resulting from Latent Semantic Analysis is a
mathematical representation of a large set of terms (words, phrases) and it is unique
to the corpus used. In other words, for the selected corpus and restrictions applied
(frequency of occurrence, part of speech, etc.), LSA represents each term as a vector.
This vector has no meaning, other than in relation to other vectors in the same
semantic space (that is, other terms from the corpus). The relationship between two
terms can be quantified with any distance or similarity measure applied to the pair
of representational vectors, such as the Euclidean distance or the cosine of the angle
between the vectors.
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Table 2 | Descriptive statistics for each of the data sets.






Rogers et al. visual 52 194 3.89 14.50 7.5
Garrard et al. sensory 52 206 3.00 11.87 5.8
Garrard et al. functional 52 144 2.27 6.29 4.4
Garrard et al. encyclopedic 47 79 2.23 3.74 4.7
Cree and McRae perceptual 52 208 2.09 8.35 4.0
Cree and McRae functional 38 87 1.32 3.03 3.5
Cree and McRae encyclopedic 47 112 1.39 3.21 3.0
Cree and McRae edited perceptual 52 214 4.22 17.37 8.1
Cree and McRae edited functional 52 81 2.68 4.17 5.2
Cree and McRae edited encyclopedic 52 115 2.86 6.33 5.5
Since we had multiple sets providing overlapping categories of
features, it became clear that one set (Cree and McRae) repeatedly
exhibited lower representational density compared to the corre-
sponding sets from alternative sources. To ensure that the low
representational density of this data set did not indicate the prob-
lem described above, we edited the feature list for each concept in
a fashion similar to Rogers et al. (2004) Specifically, we checked
all possible features against each of the 52 concepts and wherever
a feature was judged to be true of an item but was not marked in
the data set, it was added. Labels that described the same feature
were combined together as per Garrard et al. (2001). Finally, a few
extra features were added to ensure that each item had at least one
feature in each knowledge type. The statistics for the edited sets
are also shown in Table 2. After these edits, the representational
density of the Cree and McRae data set increased substantially and
was now comparable to that of the other sets.
Finally, it should be noted that in both the Garrard et al.
and the Cree and McRae data sets (including the edited version),
the sensory/perceptual representations were denser than both the
functional and the encyclopedic representations. Since this was
true of both feature lists, it is very likely that it is true of people’s
mental modality-specific representations as well. Unfortunately,
the nature of the LSA vectors did not allow us to compute a similar
measure for verbal representations.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE WITHIN INDIVIDUAL MODALITIES
Our first goal was to assess the representational structure that each
modality gives rise to. We took three distinct approaches: (1) hier-
archical cluster analyses, using the Euclidean distances between
pairs of items (the feature-based vectors of each concept) to build
dendrograms depicting the structure in each data set; (2) corre-
lational analyses, computing correlations between pairs of items
in each data set, giving rise to correlational plots depicting the
similarity structure (as opposed to distance or dissimilarity); and
(3) a different computation of the similarity between concepts,
this time using the cosine between pairs of vectors – for each item
in each data set, we produced a list of most similar concepts. All
analyses reported in this and following sections were computed
in the statistical package R using standard parameter settings. The
results are reported grouped by knowledge type/modality.
Sensory/perceptual representations
Figures 1 and 2 depict the plots for the four data sets within the
sensory/perceptual modality. They all show a relatively detailed
structure, which generally follows categorical distinctions. For
example, there is a basic separation between the animals and the
non-animals. Furthermore, the birds form a subcategory within
the animal group. Within the non-animal group, the fruits and
vegetables tend to cluster together, as do the vehicles.
Each data set comes with its own curious idiosyncrasies and
interesting trends. For example, in the Rogers et al. visual set
(Figures 1A and 2A), the animal category forms sensible subcat-
egories, including large land animals (elephant, horse, camel, and
cow), small land animals (rabbit, squirrel, frog, and mouse), canine
and felines, and reptiles. Amongst the cluster of birds, chicken
is grouped with owl, and then penguin in the dendrogram, but
the correlational plot shows that chicken is in fact most highly
correlated with peacock. Within the non-animal category, in addi-
tion to the fruits and vegetables and the vehicles, there is also a
large cluster of implements with coherent taxonomic substruc-
ture (hammer and screwdriver, pliers and scissors, hairbrush and
paintbrush). Notably, two of the vehicles, helicopter and sled, do
not group with the rest from their category in the dendrogram,
but the correlational plot again shows inter-correlations among
the whole class. Finally, the correlational graph reveals that the
associations among the non-animals are much weaker than those
among the animals.
In the Garrard et al. sensory feature dendrogram (Figure 1B),
with the exception of the bird subcategory, the animals do not
organize into subclusters as neatly as they did in the Rogers et
al. set. Also, piano curiously clusters with the bird group instead
of the non-animals (though inspection of the correlational plot
proves that this item correlates most with a few of the artifacts, and
even those correlations are very weak). Within the non-animals,
the fruits and vegetables all group together, as do the vehicles
(which form two subclusters – smaller vs. larger vehicles). While
certain tools pair together as seen before (e.g.,hairbrush and paint-
brush), there is no coherent cluster of implements. Figure 2B
shows that the artifacts correlate with each other, but consider-
ably more weakly than the living things (as seen previously). In
this set, the category of fruits and vegetables appears much more
distinct.
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FIGURE 1 | Dendrograms from hierarchical cluster analysis for each sensory/perceptual data set: (A) Rogers et al. visual; (B) Garrard et al. sensory; (C)
Cree and McRae perceptual; (D) Cree and McRae edited perceptual.
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FIGURE 2 | Correlational plots for each sensory/perceptual data set: (A)
Rogers et al. visual; (B) Garrard et al. sensory; (C) Cree and McRae
perceptual; (D) Cree and McRae edited perceptual. The relative size of the
circles represents the relative magnitude of the corresponding Pearson
correlation coefficient; positive correlations are in red, negative are in blue.
The ordering of the concepts along the two axes is identical and it is
generated automatically to best depict clusters of concepts with high
inter-correlations. As a result, the ordering may differ between graphs.
It is likely that many of the differences between the organization
seen in the Rogers et al. set vs. the Garrard et al. as well as the Cree
and McRae sets stem from the fact that the latter include not only
static (colorless) visual information but also other perceptual fea-
tures. It is also possible that drawings provide a more direct sample
of true visual experience whereas feature elicitation is inevitably
somewhat influenced by the demands and vocabulary-availability
of speech production (see Rogers et al., 2004; Hoffman et al., 2011;
Hoffman and Lambon Ralph, 2012, for further discussion of this
issue).
The original Cree and McRae perceptual set exhibits the most
puzzling structure. As can be seen in Figure 1C, the birds form their
own cluster but they group with the artifacts instead of the other
animals. The set of animals itself does not group entirely together –
tiger, mouse, and rabbit form their own little cluster, which joins
with the artifacts; and camel clusters with barrel and piano. The
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vehicles do not form a coherent group either – for example,motor-
cycle which was paired with bike in both previous sets, now pairs
with train, while bike goes with stool. Moreover, Figure 2C reveals
that there is very little and very weak correlational structure in this
data set.
We believe that this messy and weak conceptual organization
can be explained by the data set’s low representational density and,
relatedly, the inconsistent listing of features for some concepts but
not others (even when the features are relevant). This notion is
supported by comparing the structure seen in this original data
set with the edited version (Figures 1D and 2D). Figure 2D
shows a clear correlational structure, especially within the ani-
mals but also within the fruits and vegetables, and more weakly
within the artifacts (similar to the Rogers et al. and the Garrard
et al. sets). Figure 1D exhibits a highly categorical organization,
with the birds clustering together, and grouping with the rest
of the animals, and the fruits and vegetables clustering together
and attaching to the artifacts. The vehicles also cluster together
(with the exception of sled) as do the containers (barrel, bas-
ket, and dustbin). Similarly to the Rogers et al. set, the animal
group exhibits taxonomic substructure with four distinct cate-
gories – large land animals, small land animals, canine/felines, and
amphibian/reptiles.
Overall, the perceptual representations show a relatively consis-
tent and generally categorically organized conceptual structure –
which is driven not by knowledge of categories (given that category
is not coded directly in the feature vectors) but by the sheer fact that
members of specific taxonomic groups tend to share perceptual
attributes.
Functional representations
The first thing to note about the functional representations
(Figures 3 and 4) is that their organization is much flatter
than that of the perceptual ones. While the members of some
taxonomic categories do cluster together (like fruits and veg-
etables, vehicles, containers, tools), members of other categories
are often present in these clusters too, and there is consider-
ably less of the categorical substructure that was observed with
the perceptual representations (e.g., the birds as a subcategory of
animals).
In the Garrard et al. functional set, the fruits and vegetables clus-
ter together and are strongly intercorrelated (Figures 3A and 4A).
Most of the tools form a cluster as well, as do the three containers.
Eight of the animals form a separate group while the other five
join the birds group. Interestingly, the two water-inhabiting rep-
tiles (alligator and turtle) pair with penguin (a water-inhabiting
bird) and then attach to the other birds. Another curious observa-
tion is that eagle and owl (the two most prominent flyers among
the birds) pair with airplane and helicopter. The other six vehicles
form their own cluster as well.
The Cree and McRae functional set has the flattest dendrogram
(Figure 3B) and a very weak correlational structure (Figure 4B).
There are two notable groups – food, including rabbit, duck,
chicken, banana, and tomato, which intercorrelate and also form
a single cluster; transportation, including six of the eight vehi-
cles and a pair animals (camel and horse). In the dendrogram,
these items formed two separate clusters (horse, bike, and camel vs.
motorcycle, helicopter, bus, airplane, and train). In addition, orange
and pineapple are strongly correlated, as are cherry and apple.
The edited version of the Cree and McRae set has a much more
pronounced correlational structure (Figure 4C). The food group
has expanded to include all the fruits and vegetables as well as rab-
bit, duck, chicken, and cow. The artifacts all correlate together, with
the transportation subcategory now including all eight vehicles
and three animals (camel, horse, and elephant ), as well as stool –
which even though is not a means of transportation is functionally
related because it is something we sit on. A group of relatively rare
animals and birds also correlate together strongly.
The dendrogram shows a much richer structure than the orig-
inal set as well (Figure 3C). As suggested by the correlational plot,
the food items form a single coherent cluster as do the set of
rare animals and birds (dog and cat group with these animals
as well, even though they did not correlate with them). The inter-
correlated transportation items formed two separate clusters (bike,
motorcycle, sled,horse, and elephant vs. train,airplane,bus, andheli-
copter). In addition, the containers cluster together too, and the
tools form two distinct clusters (screwdriver, pliers, and hammer
vs. axe, scissors, and paintbrush).
Overall, even though we can talk about taxonomic categories
within the functional representations, the concepts in these sets
are clearly organized according to different principles compared
to the perceptual representations – the organization here is dri-
ven by item behavior and use. For example, animals mostly group
together because they do similar things (move, eat, etc.) and we
do similar things with them (look at them, feed them, cook them,
etc.). However, the few animals that have other uses (like food or
transportation) cluster with different items, not with the animal
group.
Encyclopedic representations
The encyclopedic features give rise to a conceptual structure again
flatter than the one created by perceptual features, but it is also
notably different from the functional organization. There tend to
be smaller groups of pairs and triplets of related items. The clusters
we see here generally obey the animal vs. non-animal distinction,
and the fruits and vegetables tend to group together, as do the vehi-
cles; but other than that, the organization is non-taxonomic. For
example, as in the functional sets, birds are mixed with the other
animals: not randomly but in interesting and predictable ways.
In the Garrard et al. encyclopedic set (Figures 5A and 6A), the
strongest grouping is that of the fruits and vegetables – they form
a single cluster and intercorrelate strongly. In addition, the vehi-
cles intercorrelate, but in the dendrogram they do not all group
together – there is a cluster of the three large land vehicles (train,
bus, lorry); a pairing of the smaller land vehicles (bike and motor-
cycle), and a pairing of the aircrafts (airplane and helicopter). The
dendrogram shows a cluster of 10 household items including some
tools, but the correlational plot demonstrates that, other than axe
and hammer, which pair together, these items do not correlate
with each other or with any other item; they are simply more or
less idiosyncratic. Finally, the birds and animals mostly fall into
two groups – domesticated farm animals (horse, dog, chicken, cat,
and strangely peacock, which is also listed as domesticated), and a
miscellaneous group of mostly rare animals and birds (elephant,
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FIGURE 3 | Dendrograms from hierarchical cluster analysis for each functional data set: (A) Garrard et al. functional; (B) Cree and McRae functional;
(C) Cree and McRae edited functional.
swan, alligator, tiger, turtle, camel, ostrich, and oddly duck) – these
are all species one may see at the zoo.
As with the original Cree and McRae functional set, the ency-
clopedic set exhibits a relatively flat dendrogram and weak corre-
lational structure (Figures 5B and 6B). The fruits and vegetables
are intercorrelated but they do not group together in the dendro-
gram. There are a few smaller clusters including a triplet of tools
(pliers, screwdriver, and hammer), a group of reptiles/amphibians,
a group of non-flying birds (ostrich, peacock, and penguin) and a
group of five farm animals and birds. Even though the birds appear
in different areas of the dendrogram, they are all intercorrelated
(and correlated to turtle as well). There also seem to be some
random pairings (e.g., motorcycle and tiger), though those do not
seem to be supported by the correlational plot.
In the edited Cree and McRae encyclopedic set (Figures 5C
and 6C), all the fruits and vegetables are not only intercorrelated
but also cluster together. There is also a more coherent group of
domesticated farm animals and birds (cat, dog, horse, cow, and
chicken). The triplet of tools that we observed in the original set
is still present. The flying birds (duck, swan, eagle, and owl) clus-
ter together, while the non-flying birds group with an interesting
set of animals (for example, penguin goes with two other water

























































Dilkina and Lambon Ralph Conceptual structure
FIGURE 4 | Correlational plots for each functional data set: (A) Garrard et al. functional; (B) Cree and McRae functional; (C) Cree and McRae edited
functional.
inhabitants, alligator and frog, while ostrich goes with camel). As
in the original set, the birds correlate with each other, with tur-
tle, and with alligator. It may seem strange that birds group with
reptiles/amphibians but in addition to shared habitats, these two
classes also share laying eggs.
Overall, the encyclopedic representations give rise to a relatively
flat and more localized structure with smaller groups of items
organized by relational principles such as where you normally see
these items (at home, in a toolbox, on a farm, in the garden, on the
road, in the sky, in the water, in the desert, and so on).
Verbal representations
The 52 verbal representations derived by Hoffman et al.’s LSA are
very weakly intercorrelated (Figure 7B) and seem to be the set
least organized by taxonomy (Figure 7A). There is no general dif-
ferentiation between animal and non-animal items (as we saw in

























































Dilkina and Lambon Ralph Conceptual structure
FIGURE 5 | Dendrograms from hierarchical cluster analysis for each encyclopedic data set: (A) Garrard et al. encyclopedic; (B) Cree and McRae
encyclopedic; (C) Cree and McRae edited encyclopedic.
the previous sets). Nonetheless, there are some smaller categor-
ical clusters. For example, a pair of birds (eagle and owl) and a
triplet of tools (pliers, screwdriver, and hammer) group together
and strongly intercorrelate. The four road vehicles (bus, lorry, bike,
and motorcycle) also go together.Airplane and helicopter correlate,
but they do not pair together in the dendrogram; train does not
correlate with any of the other items, and interestingly, sled cor-
relates most strongly with dog (though they do not pair together,
because dog correlates yet more strongly with cat ). Finally, there
is a coherent cluster of food items including six of the fruits and
vegetables as well as chicken. These items intercorrelate as well.
The dendrogram also includes a group of animals one may
see on a farm (horse, cow, dog, cat, mouse, rabbit, and oddly frog ),
with the addition of barrel (another item not uncommon in this
context). This cluster, however, is not supported by the correla-
tional plot (other than the pairing of dog and cat, which correlate
strongly). In addition to dog and sled, there are a few other inter-
esting pairings in this set, including elephant and tiger, hairbrush
and scissors, and piano and key. While one might argue that the
similarity between elephant and tiger and perhaps even hairbrush
and scissors is categorical in nature (perhaps due to perceptual,
encyclopedic, or functional commonalities), it is crystal clear that
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FIGURE 6 | Correlational plots for each encyclopedic data set: (A) Garrard et al. encyclopedic; (B) Cree and McRae encyclopedic; (C) Cree and McRae
edited encyclopedic.
the similarity between dog and sled and piano and key is of a
different – associative – nature.
Overall, the hierarchical cluster analysis and the pairwise cor-
relations of the verbal representations illustrate that the principle
governing the conceptual organization here is contextual similar-
ity, as would be expected given the origin of these representations.
Sometimes, this may be consistent with functional attributes (as
items that do similar things and are used in similar ways or for
similar purposes tend to appear in common verbal contexts);
other times, it may be consistent with encyclopedic attributes (e.g.,
location, origin, behavior); and in yet other cases, it may have an
associative or relational nature (e.g., dog and sled ; piano and key ;
hairbrush and scissors).
As noted at the beginning of the section, in a final effort to
assess the representational structure present in each modality-
specific feature type, we investigated the most similar items for
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FIGURE 7 | Conceptual organization of the Hoffman et al. verbal data set: (A) hierarchical cluster analysis dendrogram; (B) correlational plot.
all concepts. To do this, we used cosine as a standard mea-







. The higher the cosine, the higher the
similarity. This analysis progressed as follows: (1) calculate the
cosine of each pair of vectors in a given set; (2) for each concept,
calculate the average cosine value and its standard deviation; (3)
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for each concept, generate a list of items whose cosine with the tar-
get concept is at least two standard deviations above the average
for that target concept. In other words, the resulting lists indicated
items that were exceptionally similar to the target concept. The full
set of lists is included in Appendix. Table 3 shows 10 concepts (two
from five categories) chosen to illustrate the salient and important
differences of the conceptual structure across modalities.
Chicken is perceptually most similar to other birds including
peacock, eagle, and owl. It is functionally most similar to other
birds that don’t fly like peacock and ostrich (in the Garrard et al.
set) as well as other animals we cook and eat like duck and rabbit
(in the Cree et al. set). Encyclopedically, chicken is most similar
to other animals domesticated farm animals (cow, cat, dog, horse)
and peacock (which was also listed as domesticated), while ver-
bally it is most similar to other things we eat and/or cook together
with chicken, namely vegetables (carrot and tomato are the only
two vegetables on our concept list). Likewise, duck is perceptu-
ally most similar to swan and chicken; functionally most similar
to other animals that swim like swan, penguin and turtle (in the
Garrard et al. set) as well as other animals we eat like chicken and
rabbit (in the Cree et al. set). Encyclopedically,duck is most similar
to other animals that like water (turtle, swan, frog ); and verbally, it
is also most similar to animals in the water (turtle and swan) but
also other birds (chicken and ostrich).
These two examples draw attention to a discrepancy in the
feature labeling between the Garrard et al. set and the Cree and
McRae set. While the former included behavioral characteristics
(like flying, swimming, laying eggs) in the functional knowledge
type, the latter set classified those as encyclopedic features. Hence
the overlap in similarity we see here.
The next pair of items are two farm animals, cow and horse.
Perceptually, they are similar to each other as well as to camel
(which is another hooved animal of similar size). Functionally,
horse is most similar to other items that can be used to ride on
like camel, bike, and elephant, as well as dog (both horses and dogs
are used to pull things). Cow, on the other hand, is most similar
to other animals we cook and eat like rabbit, chicken, and duck (in
the Cree and McRae set); in the Garrard et al. set, it appears as
most similar to mouse and rabbit, but this again is an artifact of
the varying classification [in addition to being edible – which is
something cow shares with rabbit – the three animals share the
ability to breed, chew, eat, walk, and run, which are all features
that would be classified as perceptual or encyclopedic in nature
according to Cree and McRae (2003)]. Encyclopedically, cow and
horse are similar to each other as well as other domesticated farm
animals (chicken, dog, and cat ). Verbally, the two differ as well –
horse tends to appear in verbal contexts similar to bike (probably
due to their shared function), while cow tends to appear in verbal
contexts shared with elephant (this latter finding was somewhat
surprising).
The next pair of examples comes from the fruit-and-vegetable
category. Perceptually, carrot is most similar to same category
members with common shape and/or color (banana and orange)
as well as other items with an elongated shape. Likewise, apple is
most similar to tomato, orange, cherry, and pineapple. Functionally,
they also relate most highly to same category members, notably
carrot is most similar to the other vegetable in the set (tomato) as
well as some fruit we use to make juice (orange and pineapple),
while apple is most similar to cherry (both being fruits we grow
on trees in our gardens and pick, and use to make pie!) Encyclo-
pedically, both carrot and apple have most in common with other
things we commonly grow in our gardens (each other, as well as
tomato); in addition, apple is similar to other fruits that grow on
trees (cherry, banana, orange, and pineapple). Verbally, both items
share contexts with their own sets of food items (tomato, chicken,
and pineapple for carrot ; pineapple, carrot, and banana for apple).
Moving to the artifacts, bus and bike are most similar to other
vehicles in all four feature types but in subtly different ways. Per-
ceptually,bus shares the most with other large vehicles (lorry, train,
and airplane), while bike is most similar to the smaller vehicles
(motorcycle and sled). Functionally, bus is most similar to other
vehicles used for public transportation (train and airplane), while
bike is most similar to other things we can sit on and ride – not
only vehicles (motorcycle and sled) but also animals (camel and
horse). Encyclopedically, both bus and bike have most in common
with other vehicles seen on the road (lorry and motorcycle), which
also seems to be the most commonly shared verbal context (as bus
is verbally most similar to bike and lorry, and bike is verbally most
similar to motorcycle, bus, and lorry). Bike and motorcycle have a
very high verbal similarity also due to the fact that they are often
used synonymously.
The final example is a pair of tools, which – like the vehicles –
are most similar to other items from their category in all four
knowledge types. Perceptually, screwdriver has most in common
with hairbrush, hammer, and axe (they all have a single handle
and, with the exception of axe, similar size); likewise, pliers has
most in common with scissors. Functionally, both items are very
similar to implements used in a handheld manner for handiwork
(screwdriver, pliers, hammer, and paintbrush); in addition, pliers
are like scissors in that they can cut. Encyclopedically as well as
verbally, screwdriver and pliers are also most similar to each other
and hammer (which is another item commonly found in a tool-
box), but not any of the other implements that appeared in the
perceptual and functional sets.
In summary, this analysis supports the results obtained in the
hierarchical cluster analyses and the correlations – the concep-
tual representations within the investigated four knowledge types
organize in unique and sensible ways – within the perceptual
modality, conceptual structure is governed by perceptual simi-
larity (most prominently shape, size, color, and parts); within the
functional modality, the structure is directed by similarity in use
and interaction; within the encyclopedic modality, it obeys com-
monality in location, habitat, and/or behavior; within the verbal
modality, it is associative or relational (similarity within the ver-
bal domain may be functional or encyclopedic in nature but need
not be).
COMPARING CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE BETWEEN MODALITIES
The second step in our investigation was to determine how con-
ceptual structure compares across modalities. To do this, we took
the distance matrices for each set – that is, the set of Euclidean
distances between each pair of concepts within a given data set
(these same matrices were used in the hierarchical cluster analyses
discussed above) – and computed the pairwise matrix correlations
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Table 3 | Lists of items most similar to a set of 10 concepts in each of the 11 data sets.
(A)








Chicken Peacock, owl, eagle,
ostrich
Duck, eagle, owl Eagle, duck, owl, swan Peacock Tomato, carrot
Duck Swan, chicken,
peacock, ostrich
Chicken, penguin Swan, penguin, eagle, chicken, owl Swan Turtle, swan, chicken,
ostrich
Cow Camel, horse, dog Horse, camel Horse, elephant Horse, camel Elephant






















Bus Lorry, train, airplane Helicopter, airplane,
train, motorcycle


















Key, hammer, axe Scissors Hairbrush, sled Screwdriver, hammer
(B)












Chicken Owl, peacock, ostrich Duck, rabbit, banana,
tomato





Chicken, rabbit Turtle, rabbit Swan, turtle,
peacock
Swan, frog, turtle
Cow Mouse, rabbit NONE Rabbit, chicken, duck Chicken, rabbit,
horse
Chicken, cat, dog Chicken, dog, horse





























Airplane, train Airplane, train,
helicopter
Lorry, train NONE Lorry, motorcycle,
paintbrush








Pliers, hammer Pliers, hammer,
paintbrush, scissors













(a) Similarity lists for the sensory/perceptual and the verbal data sets. (b) Similarity lists for the functional and encyclopedic data sets.
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Rogers et al. visual 0.55*** 0.35* 0.27 −0.13 0.40** 0.26 0.06 0.40** −0.03
Garrard et al. Sensory 0.52*** 0.37* −0.15 0.29 0.15 −0.05 0.60*** 0.02
Cree and McRae
perceptual
0.19 −0.32* 0.24 0.19 0.03 0.32* 0.01
Garrard et al. functional 0.11 0.14 0.01 0.30* 0.31* 0.01
Cree and McRae
functional (n=38)
−0.13 −0.16 −0.03 −0.04 −0.01
Garrard et al.
encyclopedic


































Rogers et al. visual 0.55*** 0.72*** 0.27 0.08 0.40** 0.43** 0.06 0.40** −0.03
Garrard et al. Sensory 0.65*** 0.37* 0.10 0.29 0.42** −0.05 0.60*** 0.02
Cree and McRae edited
perceptual
0.42** 0.13 0.36* 0.57*** 0.22 0.46** −0.01
Garrard et al. functional 0.33* 0.14 0.14 0.30* 0.31* 0.01
Cree and McRae edited
functional
0.02 −0.03 0.13 0.28* 0.01
Garrard et al.
encyclopedic
0.43** 0.12 0.23 −0.06
Cree and McRae edited
encyclopedic
0.10 0.30* −0.01
Hoffman et al. verbal −0.03 −0.04
(a) With the original Cree and McRae feature lists; (b) with the edited Cree and McRae feature lists. ***p<0.0005, **p<0.005, *p<0.05.
for all data sets. The analysis was done twice – first with the origi-
nal Cree and McRae feature list and then with the edited version.
The results are presented in Table 4.
The most obvious finding is that the three sensory/perceptual
sets intercorrelate. The correlations between the Cree and McRae
set and the other two are greatly improved in the edited version,
especially with the Rogers et al. set where the correlation dou-
bles. There is also a notable trend for the conceptual structure
of this type of representations to correlate with that of the ency-
clopedic knowledge type (Figure 4B), but much less so with the
functional knowledge type. In fact, the original Cree and McRae
perceptual and functional sets correlated negatively. The Garrard
et al. functional set appears to organize more consistently with the
one in the sensory modality, which probably has to do with the
specific classification of features, whereby statements that had to
do with behavior (e.g., lays eggs, swims, dives, runs, flies, jumps)
were included in the functional feature list as opposed to the per-
ceptual (motion) or encyclopedic feature lists, as was done by Cree
and McRae. Finally, the conceptual structure present in the sen-
sory/perceptual modality did not correlate at all with that in the
verbal modality.
The conceptual networks in the functional and encyclopedic
modality are considerably more idiosyncratic than that in the per-
ceptual modality, as evident by the fewer significant correlations
involving these sets (Table 4a). Using the edited Cree and McRae
sets, we found that the concepts in the two functional sets organize
in similar ways (in fact, this was the only significant correlation
involving the Cree and McRae functional structure). The same is
true for the two encyclopedic sets. These two types of knowledge
did not correlate with each other, though the functional modality
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had a tendency to relate to the structure in the verbal modal-
ity. Finally, as noted above, the structure within the encyclopedic
modality also correlated with that in the perceptual modality.
The conceptual organization within the verbal modality
appears to be most unique. The only significant correlation (and
still pretty small in magnitude) was with the functional sets (Gar-
rard et al. and the edited Cree and McRae). This finding is con-
sistent with the observations we made based on the dendrograms,
correlational plots, and item similarity lists.
In summary, by statistically comparing how concepts relate to
each other in each data set, we established that the various sets,
which came from different sources, are mostly consistent with each
other (with the slight exception of the Garrard et al. functional list).
Furthermore, we found how conceptual structure relates across
modalities. The organization within the perceptual modality is
somewhat similar to that in the encyclopedic modality, and both
of those are different from the functional and verbal modality.
There is also some similarity between the functional and verbal
knowledge types, but generally, those appear to be organized in
idiosyncratic ways.
COMPARING CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE TO SIMPLE CATEGORICAL
STRUCTURE
The final goal of this investigation was to determine the degree to
which the representational networks within each modality were
taxonomically organized (i.e., organized according to category).
To do this, we generated a simple “reference” categorical structure
(Figure 8) where the animals, the artifacts, and the fruits and veg-
etables all form distinct clusters; the birds are a subcategory of
the animals, and the vehicles are a subcategory of the artifacts. We
computed the pairwise correlations of the distance matrix in this
simple categorical structure and the distance matrices in the 11
data sets. As can be seen in Table 4, the sensory/perceptual modal-
ity is the only one that consistently correlated with the taxonomic
structure, with the Garrard et al. sensory set having the highest
correlation.
We then assessed whether the correlations between the sets
and the taxonomic reference structure were significantly different
from each other, taking into account the between-set correlations.
The results are shown on Table 5 and they confirmed that tax-
onomic organization is most prominent in the Garrard et al.
sensory set. The other correlations did not systematically dif-
fer from each other, with the exception of the verbal modality,
where the lack of categorical organization was significantly differ-
ent from all sets which had notable categorical structure (the four
sensory/perceptual sets, the Garrard et al. functional set, and the
Cree and McRae edited functional and encyclopedic sets).
COMPARING CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE TO RANDOM STRUCTURE
In the modalities where concepts are not organized taxonomically,
is the structure random? To assess this, we compared the distance
matrices to 1000 random permutations of the distance matrix
from the taxonomic structure. The average correlation values are
presented in the last column of Figure 4 and none of them are sig-
nificant, confirming our previous observation that even though
concepts do not group according to category in all modalities,
there is coherent structure in each case.
DISCUSSION
This study employed a number of different data sets and analytical
methods in order to assess the structure of information arising in
four modalities of knowledge: perceptual, functional, encyclope-
dic, and verbal. We had three distinct goals in mind: (1) to establish
the organization in each modality; (2) to compare the structure
between the various modalities; and (3) to assess the degree to
which each structure is taxonomic or random.
In summary, our results showed that there is abundant struc-
ture in each of the four modalities we investigated (none of it
is random) but the organization differs across modalities. The
visual/perceptual domain is the most hierarchically organized and
closest to classic taxonomic structure. Items group into categories
and subcategories based on their prominent sensory characteris-
tics (most importantly, shape, size, color, and parts). The orga-
nization in this modality is measurably different from the one
in the functional modality, where concepts organize according to
experience of interaction and use. Generally, this does not corre-
late with perceptual experience, though occasionally it might (e.g.,
in the case of some tools, which are visually as well as function-
ally similar). Encyclopedic knowledge gives rise to yet another
conceptual organization, governed by experience of shared loca-
tion or behavior. This type of structure appears to correlate with
the organization within the perceptual domain (at least for this
set of items) but not the functional domain. Finally, the verbal
modality has the most unique structure, not at all categorical but
also not random. It centers on associative or relational knowledge.
It weakly resembles functional organization but notably deviates
from perceptual and/or encyclopedic organization.
The findings from the current and previous studies all under-
line the fact that concepts are formed from a rich multimodal
(verbal and non-verbal) set of experiences, where concepts relate
to each other and organize in distinct ways. This, in turn, raises the
question of how all these modality-specific experiences are fused
together into coherent cross-modal conceptual knowledge which
is capable of appropriate generalization across exemplars.
Some contemporary and classical theories postulate that the
semantic system is simply this distributed network of modality-
specific representations, all connected to one another (e.g., Eggert,
1977; Martin, 2007). Each modality-specific element within this
distributed network would be able to code the local statistics
(information structure) arising in that modality. There is a clear
danger, however, that this system alone would lack knowledge of
feature co-occurrence statistics across modalities (e.g., things that
have beaks usually can fly, they lay eggs, nest in the trees, and sing
songs). Without knowledge of the cross-modal coherent covari-
ation of information, the semantic system would be unable to
pull together the correct subset of cross-modal features for each
concept and to generalize this information appropriately across
concepts (Smith and Medin, 1981; Wittgenstein, 2001; Rogers and
McClelland, 2004; Lambon Ralph et al., 2010). Extracting this kind
of statistics is more than a simple linear summation of the indi-
vidual modalities or learning pairwise correlations (see Rogers
and McClelland, 2004, for a computational demonstration; and
Lambon Ralph et al., 2010, for further discussion).
In keeping with these observations, a recent investigation
employed a graph-theoretic approach to look at the relative

























































Dilkina and Lambon Ralph Conceptual structure
FIGURE 8 | Conceptual organization of a simple taxonomic structure: (A) hierarchical cluster analysis dendrogram; (B) correlational plot.
contribution of perceptual and functional knowledge (based on
Cree and McRae’s feature lists) to the conceptual organization of
130 common nouns, all acquired by 30 months of age (Hills et al.,
2009). Hills and colleagues constructed three types of conceptual
network – using the full set of features, using only the perceptual
features, and using only the functional features. By calculating the
average clustering coefficient for nodes in each network (that is,
their tendency to share features with neighboring nodes), they
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Table 5 | Correlations between the distance matrices in each data set and the correlation matrix in a simple taxonomic structure.
(A)























0.60*** 0.32* 0.31* −0.04 0.23 0.1 −0.03
Rogers et al. visual 0.40** X X X X
Garrard et al. sensory 0.60*** X X X X X X
Cree and McRae perceptual 0.32* X
Garrard et al. functional 0.31* X
Cree and McRae functional (n=38) −0.04
Garrard et al. encyclopedic 0.23
Cree and McRae encyclopedic (n=47) 0.1
(B)
























0.60*** 0.46** 0.31* 0.28* 0.23 0.30* −0.03
Rogers et al. visual 0.40** X X
Garrard et al. sensory 0.60*** X X X X X
Cree and McRae edited perceptual 0.46** X
Garrard et al. functional 0.31* X
Cree and McRae edited functional 0.28* X
Garrard et al. encyclopedic 0.23
Cree and McRae edited encyclopedic 0.30* X
Ticks mark values that are significantly different from each other (p<0.05), (a) With the original Cree and McRae feature lists; (b) with the edited Cree and McRae
feature lists.
evaluated the existence of structure in the networks (groups and
subgroups of nodes). Their results closely resembled what we
found here – there was significant structure (compared to ran-
dom) in all three networks; the perceptual network was much
denser than the functional network and clusters in the latter were
smaller in size. Like ours, their results also indicated that these two
types of features contribute differently to category organization.
Furthermore, Hills et al. showed that despite the differences in
the organization of these two modalities, the two types of features
have a high degree of correspondence (or coherent covariation),
creating conceptual structure above and beyond the structure
existing in each one modality.
Recently, a number of investigations have focused on how ver-
bal knowledge can be combined with feature type knowledge. For
example, Steyvers (2010) presented a probabilistic model in which
a text-based data-driven approach to extracting semantic infor-
mation is augmented with knowledge of perceptual, functional,
and encyclopedic features for a set of 287 animate and inani-
mate concepts. The results showed that the addition of feature
information improved the model’s ability to generalize. Similarly,
Durda et al. (2009) reported a neural network model trained
with 445 concepts to map from textual co-occurrence vectors
(similar to the verbal representation analyzed in our study) to
feature representations based on the Cree and McRae norms. Like
Steyver’s model, this model also exhibited a notable ability to
generalize to novel concepts (i.e., ones it had not been trained on).
In an impressive computational modeling study, Andrews et al.
(2009) adopted a probabilistic approach to extract semantics from
a data set including both verbal and non-verbal (i.e., feature)
information. The authors referred to these two types of informa-
tion as distributional and experiential, respectively, to emphasize
the point that language-based knowledge is qualitatively different
from sensory-functional type of knowledge. Their distributional
data set included about 8,000 short texts from the British National
Corpus (each 150–250 words long), while their experiential data
set included feature norms for 456 concepts. The model was
trained using either set alone, the two sets in conjunction, or the
two sets independently. In line with our findings, Andrews and
colleagues observed that the semantic structure learned from the
two types of information is markedly distinct, and further dis-
tinct from (and not as rich as) the structure arising when the two
types of information are combined. Notably, they found that the
structure in the two models trained with a single data set cor-
related higher with the structure in the model trained with the
two sets independently than the one trained with the two sets
jointly, suggesting that the conceptual organization arising under
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simultaneous exposure to multiple information sources is unique
and different from the one arising from a single source or a linear
combination of the multiple sources.
To assess performance, the model’s learned semantic similar-
ity between concepts was compared to human behavioral data
including lexical substitution errors, word-association norms, lex-
ical priming, and semantic errors in picture naming. The results
showed that the combined model was most similar to the behav-
ioral data. The authors discussed the importance of both ver-
bal and non-verbal information in the acquisition of semantic
knowledge, and emphasized the point that cross-modal semantic
representations rely on exposure to the statistical structure (what
we earlier called coherent covariation) both within and between
modalities.
All these findings and observations imply that additional com-
putational machinery is required to fuse modality-specific infor-
mation together to form coherent concepts. One possibility is
provided by the hub-and-spoke account (e.g., Rogers et al., 2004;
Patterson et al., 2007; Lambon Ralph et al., 2010; Pobric et al.,
2010) which inherits the basic premise that the multiple ver-
bal and non-verbal modalities provide the raw ingredients for
the formation of concepts (they are the “spokes” of the seman-
tic system) but there is an additional component (the “hub” of
the system) that mediates between the various modalities. The
representations learned in the hub are based on complex non-
linear mappings among the modality-specific representations in
the spokes (Wittgenstein, 2001; Lambon Ralph et al., 2010). Just as
modality-specific knowledge pools have been localized to distinct
areas in the brain, so has the proposed transmodal representa-
tional hub – with the anterior inferolateral temporal area being
one crucial region. The clearest neuropsychological example of
this comes from investigations of semantic dementia, where the
patients’ maximal damage in this region leads to multimodal yet
selective semantic impairment (Warrington, 1975; Snowden et al.,
1989; Hodges et al., 1992; Bozeat et al., 2000). Convergent evidence
for the importance of this region in semantic representation has
been provided by functional imaging and repetitive transcranial
magnetic stimulation studies with neurologically intact individu-
als (e.g., Vandenberghe et al., 1996; Marinkovic et al., 2003; Pobric
et al., 2007; Binney et al., 2010; Visser and Lambon Ralph, 2011;
Peelen and Caramazza, 2012; Visser et al., 2012). In addition, the
location and connectivity of the transmodal hub has recently been
established using diffusion-weighted tractography in neurologi-
cally intact participants (Binney et al., 2012) and its breakdown in
semantic dementia (Acosta-Cabronero et al., 2011).
Two aspects of the hub-and-spoke theory are crucial. The first
is that the transmodal hub provides the neural machinery to
compute the non-linear mappings required for the formation of
coherent concepts and their generalization on the basis of seman-
tic rather than superficial (modality-specific) similarities. Indeed,
recent targeted investigations of semantic dementia have shown
that, in both verbal and non-verbal domains, the patients lose the
coherence of these concepts and thus exhibit over- and under-
generalization errors (Lambon Ralph and Patterson, 2008; Lam-
bon Ralph et al., 2010; Mayberry et al., 2011). The second crucial
aspect of this theory is that semantic representations require
the combination of transmodal (hub) and modality-specific
information sources. It is not, therefore, an issue of debating
whether semantic representations are underpinned by hub OR
spokes but rather how these work together to form coherent con-
cepts. The importance of both elements is indicated in recent func-
tional neuroimaging studies (e.g.,Visser and Lambon Ralph, 2011;
Peelen and Caramazza, 2012; Visser et al., 2012) and confirmed by
probing hub-and-spoke regions in the same participants using
rTMS (e.g., Pobric et al., 2010). In such circumstances, transient
suppression of the transmodal ATL hub generates a pan-category
semantic impairment whereas stimulation of the dorsal aspects of
the inferior parietal lobule generates a category-specific impair-
ment for manmade objects that relates directly to the suppression
of praxis information that is coded in this region.
A recent behavioral paper focused around the issue of how
concept-relevant information from different modalities is com-
bined into coherent and useful cross-modal semantic representa-
tions (McNorgan et al., 2011). The authors distinguished between
two types of theories: (1) what they called“shallow”theories,which
postulate either direct connectivity between modality-specific rep-
resentations (i.e., distributed multimodal semantics) or a connec-
tivity of those areas into a single mediating construct (a cross-
modal semantic hub); and (2) “deep” theories, which postulate
a hierarchy of mediating constructs (convergence zones), which
progressively combine modality-specific knowledge into increas-
ingly more cross-modal representations (higher order modality-
specific areas, bi-modal areas, tri-modal areas, and so on). Note
that this classification would include both the multimodal seman-
tic models and the hub-and-spoke framework discussed above
under the “shallow” classification. The assumption is that the
two types of models make different predictions about the pro-
cessing time required to integrate information coming from a
single modality vs. the processing time required to ingrate infor-
mation coming from multiple modalities. They used four verbal
feature verification tasks and the results supported a deep model of
semantics. One weakness of this study is the use of verbal stimuli.
The unspoken assumption that these stimuli will in fact activate
modality-specific representations (such as visual or functional),
and only then propagate activation forward to convergence zones
or any associative areas is not discussed and may in fact have
distinct implications for the different theories. This combined
with the lack of imagining data to complement the behavioral
findings hinders the ability to make claims about the process-
ing involved in the tasks: what modality-specific and association
areas are involved, what are the temporal dynamics, and so on.
Nonetheless, the investigation provides further support to the
notion that the semantic system involves more than simply dis-
tributed modality-specific areas, and presents an interesting and
useful approach to distinguishing between models of semantics.
Returning to the original objective of our study, the natural
next step in establishing the structure of the semantic system
is to inquire about the conceptual organization of cross-modal
representations. We found that modality-specific pools of knowl-
edge exhibit meaningful and unique structure. How does this
structure compare to a cross-modal combined representation of
this knowledge? And how do the various modalities contribute?
A number of previous investigations (e.g., Andrews et al., 2009;
Durda et al., 2009; Steyvers, 2010) seem to attribute a prominent
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role to verbal information− contrasting it with feature type infor-
mation independent of its modality, as opposed to treating it as yet
another modality of experience as we have done in our approach
(see also, Plaut, 2002; Rogers et al., 2004, for similar approaches
within a connectionist paradigm).
Last but not least, we will consider a few methodological issues
and contributions from our current work. Feature listings have
often been criticized in the past as an unreliable method to probe
people’s semantic knowledge (e.g., Murphy and Medin, 1985;
Rogers et al., 2004) for at least three reasons: (1) participants
know much more about each concept than what they list in any
one study (therefore, the lists are incomplete); (2) the features
that participants give is a potentially random sample of their full
knowledge (therefore, the lists are inconsistent/variable); and (3)
the knowledge is probed verbally for all types of features (there-
fore, the information provided is filtered by vocabulary demands
which may impact some modalities of knowledge more than others
because the attributes in that domain do not have verbal labels or
are hard to express, e.g., elements of praxis or non-verbal auditory
sounds).
We found that one way to improve the quality of the feature list-
ings was to consider all features listed (independent of concept)
and to re-score each concept against each feature. This guards
against (quite common) cases where participants generate a cer-
tain feature (e.g.,“has a long neck”) for one concept (e.g., swan) but
not for another (e.g.,peacock), even though it applies to both. Also,
features that describe identical or similar aspects of the concept
(e.g., “has a box-like shape” and “looks like a square”) should be
grouped together to minimize redundancy and improve concept
overlap. Although laborious (especially if undertaken for more
than the 52 concepts considered in this study), combining these
two techniques counteracts the incomplete and variable nature of
feature listings. In this study, for example, it greatly improved the
representational density of the Cree and McRae data set, which
in turn resulted in an improved and more informative emergent
structure.
The present investigation also provided an insight into the third
concern listed above. We found that conceptual representations
based on verbally reported features, taken to provide information
about non-verbal modalities, are distinctly different from con-
ceptual representations based on verbal experience (i.e., using the
concept names in context). The established similarity and coher-
ence between perceptual representations based on feature norms
(re-scored) and perceptual representations based on participants’
drawings further supported the notion that verbal feature listings
provide a close approximation of modality-specific non-verbal
knowledge.
Of course, we have only considered a handful of knowledge
types. The fact is that experience in some modalities (olfactory,
gustatory, tactile, etc.) may not be as easily verbalized as visual
or motor experience. Some researchers have solved this prob-
lem by asking their participants to give a rating of how relevant
each knowledge type is to a specific item, instead of listing fea-
tures of various types (e.g., Gainotti et al., 2009; Hoffman and
Lambon Ralph, 2012). Gainotti et al. (2009) presented college
students with the pictures and names of 28 living things and 21
artifacts, and asked them to rate the familiarity of each item and
to indicate (on a scale from 0 to 7) how relevant each source
of modality-specific knowledge was in defining each item. The
knowledge types included visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, gus-
tatory, motor/functional, and encyclopedic. The raw scores were
transformed into percentages indicating the relative contribution
of each modality to each concept. Their results indicated that olfac-
tory and gustatory experience was significantly relevant only to the
plant subcategory (fruits, vegetables, and flowers), whereas tactile
experience was most relevant to the same categories as functional
experience, namely artifacts such as tools, clothing, and furni-
ture. Even though the clever methodology allowed the researchers
to collect data for all modalities (even those where features or
attributes may not be easy to report), the analysis suffers from the
same assumption as the other studies discussed earlier – namely
that there is categorical organization within each modality, which
as we have established here is not the standard structure across
modalities.
CONCLUSION
This study looked at three distinct methods of probing modality-
specific knowledge (feature listings, drawings, and verbal co-
occurrence statistics) to assess the conceptual structure in four
modalities: perceptual, functional, encyclopedic, and verbal.
Unlike previous studies, we did not assume that taxonomic cat-
egories exist in each knowledge type. Instead, we utilized a data-
driven approach to reveal distinct and logical organization of con-
cepts in each modality. Only the perceptual modality consistently
exhibited significant categorical structure. Verbal representations
had the most idiosyncratic organization, weakly related to the
functional representations and very dissimilar from the perceptual
and encyclopedic representations, which were somewhat similarly
organized. Thus, the semantic system draws from these rich and
multifaceted modality-specific pools of knowledge, each with a
complex representational structure, to form coherent transmodal
representations.
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APPENDIX
FULL LIST OF CONCEPTS AND MOST SIMILAR ITEMS IN EACH DATA SET
Procedure
In each data set, the cosine between each pair of representational vectors was computed. The items included in the following lists have
a cosine with the target concept at least two standard deviations above the average cosine value for that target concept. NONE= no
items exceeded the threshold. NA= this target concept was not present in the set.
Table A1 | Lists for the four sensory/perceptual sets and the verbal set.










Airplane Bus, lorry, train,
helicopter
Helicopter, train, bus Eagle, sled Bus, helicopter, train,
motorcycle
Helicopter, tiger




























Dustbin, axe Dustbin, camel Basket, dustbin Rabbit





Bike Motorcycle, screwdriver Motorcycle, sled, bus Motorcycle, train, sled Motorcycle, sled Motorcycle, bus, lorry




Paintbrush, sled Paintbrush, scissors
Bus Lorry, train, airplane Helicopter, airplane, train,
motorcycle
Motorcycle, lorry, train Train, airplane, helicopter,
lorry, motorcycle
Bike, lorry
Camel Cow, horse, dog Cow, horse Barrel, cow, horse Horse, cow Elephant, tiger

























Apple, tomato, dustbin Apple, tomato, orange,
pineapple
Apple, orange, toaster
Chicken Peacock, owl, eagle,
ostrich
Duck, eagle, owl Eagle, duck, owl, swan Peacock Tomato, carrot
Cow Camel, horse, dog Horse, camel Horse, elephant Horse, camel Elephant





Chicken, penguin Swan, penguin, eagle,
chicken, owl
Swan Turtle, swan, chicken,
ostrich
Dustbin Barrel, envelope, piano,
candle
Barrel, basket Hairbrush, stool, key, sled Barrel, basket Basket, cat, lorry
Eagle Peacock, chicken,
ostrich, owl
Owl, chicken, swan, ostrich Chicken, duck, owl, swan,
peacock
Owl Owl
Elephant Cow, dog, camel Turtle Horse, squirrel Horse Tiger, turtle, squirrel,
alligator
Envelope Barrel, dustbin Bus, train Candle, paintbrush, pliers,
sled
Basket, dustbin Dustbin, scissors,
basket
(Continued)
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Table A1 | Continued










Frog Rabbit, alligator, mouse Alligator Turtle, cat, cow Turtle Turtle, rabbit
Hammer Screwdriver, key Axe, hairbrush Axe, basket, screwdriver Axe, screwdriver, hairbrush Screwdriver, pliers
Helicopter Airplane, bus, lorry Airplane, bus, train Scissors, train, hammer Airplane, bus, train Airplane, motorcycle,
tiger
Horse Cow, camel Mouse, dog Elephant, squirrel, cat Cow, camel Bike
Key Hammer, screwdriver Pliers, hairbrush, hammer,
screwdriver
Dustbin, stool Dustbin, stool Piano
Lorry Bus, train Motorcycle, airplane, train Bus, motorcycle, train Bus, train, airplane,
motorcycle, helicopter
Motorcycle, bike, bus
Motorcycle Bike Bike, sled, lorry Train, bus, bike, lorry Bike, airplane, bus, train,
lorry
Bike, lorry
Mouse Rabbit Rabbit, squirrel, cat, horse Squirrel, cat, rabbit Rabbit, squirrel Paintbrush, rabbit, frog
Orange Apple, banana, tomato Cherry, tomato, apple,
carrot
Tomato, apple, cherry Banana, tomato, cherry,
carrot, apple, pineapple
Pineapple, carrot
Ostrich Swan, chicken, eagle,
peacock




Eagle, chicken Eagle, swan, chicken, duck Eagle Eagle
Paintbrush Screwdriver, hairbrush,
axe, hammer
Hairbrush, axe Basket, hairbrush,
screwdriver
Hairbrush, basket, sled Hairbrush, mouse




Eagle, owl, swan Ostrich, swan, duck Swan, orange
Penguin Owl, chicken Duck, swan, chicken, eagle Duck, swan Duck, swan Swan, cat
Piano Dustbin, stool, sled Barrel, hammer Barrel, cow Bus Key, hammer
Pineapple Tomato, banana, apple Apple, cherry, tomato,
carrot, banana, orange




Pliers Scissors, orange, apple Key, hammer, axe Scissors Hairbrush, sled Screwdriver, hammer
Rabbit Squirrel Mouse, cat, squirrel Mouse, alligator Squirrel, mouse Cat, squirrel, mouse
Scissors Pliers, key, orange Screwdriver, axe Hairbrush, pliers, sled,
helicopter, dustbin




Axe, hairbrush, scissors Hairbrush, hammer,
paintbrush, axe
Hammer, paintbrush, axe Pliers, hammer
Sled Stool, piano, bus Motorcycle, bike Hairbrush, scissors Hairbrush, paintbrush Dog, cat
Squirrel Rabbit, cat Mouse, cat Horse, mouse, elephant,
cat
Rabbit, mouse, cat Turtle, elephant, tiger
Stool Sled, candle, piano Basket, sled Dustbin Dustbin, hairbrush, sled Candle
Swan Ostrich, duck, chicken Eagle, penguin, ostrich Duck, penguin, eagle, owl,
chicken
Duck, peacock Duck, ostrich, pineapple
Tiger Dog, cat Mouse, squirrel, horse Cat, eagle, piano, rabbit Cat, dog Elephant, turtle, squirrel









Apple, cherry, orange Chicken, carrot,
pineapple
Train Bus, lorry, airplane Airplane, helicopter, bus,
lorry
Motorcycle Bus, airplane, helicopter,
motorcycle, lorry
Camel, sled
Turtle Alligator Elephant Frog, stool, squirrel Alligator Elephant, squirrel, tiger,
alligator
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Table A2 | Lists for the three functional and the three encyclopedic sets.












Airplane Helicopter, sled Train, bus Bus, helicopter, lorry Helicopter, piano Helicopter Helicopter, bus, train
Alligator Penguin, swan, turtle NA Frog, ostrich, owl,
peacock, penguin,
turtle













Axe Scissors, pliers Scissors Scissors, hairbrush,
paintbrush
Hammer, camel, ostrich Alligator, motorcycle,
tiger
Scissors, paintbrush













Barrel Dustbin, basket NONE Dustbin, basket NA NA Dustbin, hammer,
pliers, scissors
Basket Dustbin, barrel NONE Dustbin, barrel NA NONE Barrel, dustbin,
hammer, pliers,
scissors
Bike Sled, motorcycle Camel, horse Camel, motorcycle,
sled, horse




NA Paintbrush, scissors NONE NA Dustbin, paintbrush
Bus Train, lorry,
motorcycle
Airplane, train Airplane, train,
helicopter
Lorry, train NONE Lorry, motorcycle,
paintbrush
Camel Horse, cow Bike, horse Elephant, bike, stool,
horse
Axe, ostrich, elephant NONE Ostrich, elephant








Apple, tomato Apple, tomato














Duck, cow, rabbit Peacock, cow, cat Cow, peacock Cow, dog, horse
Cow Mouse, rabbit NONE Rabbit, chicken, duck Chicken, rabbit, horse Chicken, cat, dog Chicken, dog, horse







Chicken, rabbit Turtle, rabbit Swan, turtle,
peacock
Swan, frog, turtle
Dustbin Basket, barrel NA Basket, barrel NA NA Hairbrush, barrel,
hammer, pliers,
scissors
Eagle Owl, swan, peacock NA Ostrich, owl, peacock,
penguin, swan, turtle











NONE Lorry, stool NA NONE Paintbrush
(Continued)
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Table A2 | Continued



























Axe, camel Pliers, screwdriver Screwdriver, barrel,
dustbin, scissors
Helicopter Airplane, eagle Camel, airplane Airplane, bus, train Airplane, motorcycle Airplane Airplane




Key Basket, dustbin NONE Hairbrush, paintbrush NONE NONE Barrel, dustbin,
hammer, pliers,
scissors
Lorry Train, bus NA Airplane, train Bus, train, motorcycle NA Bus, motorcycle






Bike, lorry, train Axe, scissors, sled Lorry, bike, bus, axe















Ostrich Peacock NA Eagle, alligator, frog,
swan




NA Eagle, alligator, frog,
swan





NONE NA Axe, hairbrush, piano

























































Pliers, hammer Pliers, hammer,
paintbrush, scissors
NONE Hammer, pliers Hammer, pliers
Sled Bike, airplane, camel NONE Bike, motorcycle,
stool
NONE Motorcycle Paintbrush, bike
(Continued)
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Table A2 | Continued












Squirrel Cat, mouse, rabbit NA Mouse, alligator,
rabbit




NONE Camel NA None Paintbrush, toaster
Swan Penguin, duck,
alligator
NA Eagle, ostrich, owl,
peacock, penguin,
turtle
Alligator Duck, peacock Duck, eagle, peacock
Tiger Mouse, rabbit, cat,
squirrel


















Airplane, bus Bus, helicopter, lorry Lorry, bus, motorcycle NONE Bus, paintbrush
Turtle Duck, alligator,
penguin
NA Eagle, alligator, frog,
swan
Duck, squirrel, ostrich Frog Peacock, alligator,
penguin, ostrich
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